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ABSTRACT
Ethereum crypto-games are a booming and relatively unex-
plored area of the games industry. While there is no consensus
definition yet, ‘crypto-games’ commonly denotes games that
store tokens, e.g. in-game items, on a distributed ledger atop
a cryptocurrency network. This enables the trading of game
items for cryptocurrency, which can then be exchanged for
regular currency. Together with their chance-based mechanics,
this makes crypto-games part of the recent convergence of
digital gaming and gambling. In a first effort to scope the
field, this paper surveys popular crypto-games, which use the
Ethereum cryptocurrency, to tease out characteristic technical
properties and gameplay. It then compares the games’ features
with criteria found in current legal and psychological defini-
tions of gambling. We find that the popular crypto-games
selected meet a combined legal and psychological definition
of gambling, and conclude with ramifications for future re-
search.
CCS Concepts
•Applied computing→ Electronic data interchange;
Author Keywords
Distributed ledger; Ethereum; crypto-games; gambling;
regulation; blockchain gaming
INTRODUCTION
Crypto-games are video games with a fully or partially dis-
tributed ledger architecture that operate atop a cryptocurrency
network, giving players provable ownership over the virtual
goods they contain. This also allows players to exchange
virtual goods for cryptocurrency, which in turn can be ex-
changed into real currency. Crypto-games are thus an instance
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of real-money gaming [26] and, due to their chance-based
mechanics, of the recent convergence of gaming and gam-
bling [12,20]. Similar phenomena, like loot boxes, or gacha
games, have drawn the attention of regulators, whose con-
cerns regard whether they pose risks similar to gambling and
therefore require similar regulation [22]. Interestingly, this
discussion has not yet reached crypto-games.
Examples of crypto-games include CryptoKitties andGods Un-
chained, whose gameplay involves using these virtual goods
to complete in-game objectives. They are growing in player
popularity, with CryptoKitties generating over £26 million in
sales since its creation in the last two years1. Perhaps more
importantly, crypto-games draw enormous attention in the
games industry, with events like the Crypto Games Confer-
ence attracting 1,500 delegates in 2019 2. In March 2019, the
blockchain gaming startup Forte announced an investment of
US$100 million to fund blockchain game development 3.
Despite the growing player popularity and industry interest
in crypto-games, research on them has been limited. In this
paper, we therefore provide an overview of current crypto-
games, drawing on a sample of popular games on the Ethereum
cryptocurrency. We begin by introducing distributed ledgers,
blockchains, and cryptocurrencies, discussing some advan-
tages and trade-offs of such decentralised architectures for
games, followed by the contested distinction between gaming
and gambling with respect to the underlying technology of
crypto-games. We then describe the gameplay and mechanics
of current crypto-games. Finally, we compare crypto-games
to psychological and legal definitions of gambling to assess to
what extent they warrant deeper scrutiny by player researchers
and legal scholars. This will also assist designers in the de-
1See developer website: https://www.dapperlabs.com/, accessed
05/07/2019.
2See event page: https://cryptogames.events, accessed
05/07/2019.
3See https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/12/forte-and-ripple-
form-100-million-fund-for-mainstream-blockchain-games,
accessed 05/07/2019.
Term Definition
Distributed ledger A system for recording and synchronising data across multiple identical copies at separate sites
Blockchain One implementation of distributed ledgers storing records in a sequence of linked blocks
Blockchain gaming Umbrella term for the use of distributed ledger technologies in digital games and gambling
Cryptocurrency A decentralised digital currency using a distributed ledger to record and prove ownership
Crypto-game A game whose in-game tokens are stored on a distributed ledger atop a cryptocurrency network
DApp A decentralised application with code and data stored on a distributed ledger
Digital wallet An alphanumeric key pair used to verify transactions on cryptocurrency networks
Ether (ETH) The token used to ‘purchase’ compute power on the Ethereum network
Ethereum A popular cryptocurrency network that can support DApps
Ethereum crypto-game A crypto-game running as a DApp on the Ethereum cryptocurrency network
Gacha game A game where players purchase ‘lucky draws’ to acquire virtual items of different rarities [22]
iGaming Short hand for internet gambling e.g. online poker, roulette, etc.
Loot Box Items in video games purchased with real-money which contain randomised contents [36].
Standard game Any game not using distributed ledger technologies, for example Hearthstone, Fortnite, etc.
Table 1. Definitions of terms used throughout this paper.
velopment of crypto-games that don’t replicate gambling ser-
vices.
BACKGROUND
Distributed Ledger Technologies
In broadest terms, the technology underlying crypto-games are
distributed ledgers. Distributed ledgers are identical copies of
files recording transactions that are stored across several sites
and kept aligned through a consensus mechanism [3]. Take a
network game where players can trade virtual gold for virtual
swords. The ownership of any virtual item must be recorded
somewhere to ensure persistence of the item within the game.
Traditionally, game provider C may store this information on
their own central game server. When player A sells a sword to
player B in-game, this triggers a request from player A’s client
computer to game provider C’s server to update the sword’s
ownership entry in its database. Game provider C’s server
database here is a central ledger - a single authoritative record
of transactions. While central ledgers can be efficient, they
also constitute a single point of failure, and they require every
player to trust the entity controlling them. If a network glitch
corrupts the transfer of a transaction to the server, or a hacker
manipulates its database, or the game provider decides one
morning to wipe all swords off the in-game world, the players
would lose their virtual swords. With a distributed ledger, all
nodes of the network - here, players A, B, and game provider
C - keep an identical copy of the ledger. Every time someone
issues a change to the ledger, e.g. sells a sword to someone
else, one or several nodes of the network then process this
transaction and use some consensus mechanism among all
nodes to establish the new correct entry, which is then copied
onto all ledgers. Thus, participants don’t have to trust any
single node to not lose or corrupt or manipulate the ledger.
A popular distributed ledger technology is a blockchain, where
the ledger is organised in a sequence of blocks of entries, and
each block includes an encoded or cryptographic representa-
tion (a so-called ‘hash’) of all prior blocks. Hashes are unique -
any set of encoded data will generate one and the same unique
hash - and can be easily automatically verified. Thus, they
ensure that none of the previously recorded blocks have be
tampered with.
While there are many use cases for distributed ledgers, the
most well-known application are cryptocurrencies, digital cur-
rencies that use a cryptographically secured distributed ledger
like a blockchain [24]. Like distributed ledger technology
more generally, cryptocurrencies have seen several waves of
interest in recent years [17], with a combined market capital-
isation of over US$130 billion as of March 22, 20194. This
value is especially noteworthy given state limitations on the
exchange of cryptocurrencies into real currencies, with some
nation states outright banning their exchange [19]. Although
Bitcoin, the ‘flag bearer’ of cryptocurrencies, frequently ex-
periences large fluctuations in price, the overall market of
cryptocurrencies has grown approximately 620% in the last 3
years4. Bitcoin popularised the consensus mechanism of proof
of work: to earn the right to add a new transaction to the block
chain, as part of the transaction entry, nodes have to solve
complicated mathematical puzzles that take a lot of comput-
ing time to solve but are again quick to verify. This prevents
people from spamming the distributed ledger with entries. In
Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies, the computing cost
for generating such a new entry is rewarded with new Bitcoin
that the system ’drops’ at a random rate. Participating in the
distributed ledger network is thus financially rewarded.
Next to cryptocurrencies, the second popular type of dis-
tributed ledger use case are Decentralised Applications
(DApps) [33]. These are software applications whose data
and processes are stored on a distributed ledger. The actual
processing of the application code happens across the network
of computers running the DApp in question. Most DApps
operate on a cryptocurrency network which rewards nodes for
running the application with small amounts of cryptocurrency.
Again, this decentralised architecture means in principle that
the DApp is not dependent on the functioning or trustworthi-
ness of any particular node5.
4See https://coinmarketcap.com/ for valuations, accessed
22/03/2019.
5For an accessible primer on these technologies, see [29].
Distributed Ledger Technologies in Games
The ongoing media and investment attention around dis-
tributed ledger technologies has led game developers to ex-
plore their potential for gaming and gambling, especially on-
line gambling (also called iGaming). A recent empirical sur-
vey found that games constitute the single largest category
of DApps, making up 47% of all DApps recorded [33]. The
crypto-game CryptoKitties is currently the third largest DApp
by number of transactions [33].
Industry observers hasten to emphasise that we are in the
early days of exploring the intersection of distributed ledger
technologies and games6. A substantial portion of current
industry and, where existing, academic discourse is engaging
in speculative conceptualisation of opportunities (see [10]
for one example). This nascent state is reflected in the lack
of defined terminology. Terms like ‘blockchain gaming’ or
‘crypto-games’ are used interchangeably without much clarity
over what they refer to. For our purposes, we will here use
the term ‘blockchain gaming’ to refer to any use of distributed
ledger technologies like blockchains or cryptocurrencies in
digital gaming and gambling.
Given the speculative nature of the present discourse, we will
in the following focus on one particular subset of blockchain
gaming that has seen actual technical implementations and
player uptake, namely games that are DApps built atop the
Ethereum cryptocurrency. In the following, we will use the
term ‘crypto-games’ to refer to games whose allocation of
in-game tokens is stored on a distributed ledger atop a cryp-
tocurrency network, and ‘Ethereum crypto-games’ to refer to
crypto-games that are DApps running on the Ethereum cryp-
tocurrency. Again, we emphasise that crypto-games in general
and Ethereum crypto-games in particular may be the currently
dominant form of distributed ledger technologies applied to
games, but present only one possible instantiation.
Gaming and Gambling
Gambling and gaming have been traditionally considered as
distinct activities supported by distinct kinds of games. How-
ever, with the rise of so-called free-to-play and service games,
traditional ‘gaming’ games are increasingly integrating ongo-
ing real money payments for in-game items, which have more
recently been connected with chance-based mechanics. Real-
money exchange and chance are the two traditionally defining
features of gambling games [37]. Examples of this conver-
gence of gaming and gambling include gacha games [22] and
loot boxes [37]. Where gacha games may be described as a
game where players purchase ‘lucky draws’ to acquire vir-
tual items of different rarities, and loot boxes are items in
video games purchased with real money which contain ran-
domised contents, as in Table 1. These have raised concerns
whether games integrating mechanics like loot boxes might
carry the same potentially adverse psychological effects as
gambling games, and therefore, whether they should be regu-
lated alike [7].
6See https://venturebeat.com/2019/05/03/the-deanbeat-why-
the-smart-kids-are-moving-into-blockchain-games/ and
https://venturebeat.com/2018/04/05/gamesbeat-summit-2018-
working-on-the-block-chain-gang/, accessed 05/07/2019.
Whilst some analysts find that e.g. loot boxes meet psycholog-
ical definitions of gambling [7], national regulators differ in
their classification [22] [31]. Notably, psychological and legal
definitions focus on different aspects; the financial value of
winnings in the legal instance, versus the nature of the activity
itself in the psychological instance. For this reason, authors
like Macey have called for more research on these topics in
the context of video games [27].
On the surface, crypto-games share many similarities with
free-to-play games that have come under scrutiny. Specif-
ically, both involve virtual currency that can be purchased
with real currency. Psychologically, both free-to-play games
and crypto-games virtual currencies often compound what has
been called the numerosity effect [18], where multiple cur-
rencies and uncommonly divisible quantities prevent players
from making intuitive value estimations. This may lead to
players spending more than intended given the obfuscation of
real world value [18]. For example, in a free-to-play game,
one in-game apple may cost 7 gems (an in-game currency).
40 gems may cost 0.155 coins (another in-game currency),
and one coin costs £250. In this instance, calculating the cost
of one in-game apple in real currency becomes non-trivial 7.
In crypto-games, in-game items and activities have similar
fractional cryptocurrency costs, with one unit of a given cryp-
tocurrency typically having a non-intuitive and fluctuating real
money exchange rate.
Despite this and other similarities between crypto-games and
other forms of video-gaming that approach gambling, to our
knowledge, there has been no analysis as to whether crypto-
games meet current definitions of gambling. Therefore, follow-
ing descriptions of Ethereum crypto-games and their mechan-
ics in the following section, we present and combine gambling
definitions to assess whether the Ethereum crypto-games sam-
pled meet gambling criteria.
ETHEREUM CRYPTO-GAMES
With technical and definitional underpinnings considered, we
now continue to describe current Ethereum crypto-games in
their technical properties, gameplay, and mechanics. We
base our description on a sample of the nine highest-ranked
Ethereum DApp games listed on ‘State of the Dapps’, a web-
site ranking DApps according to user numbers, transaction
volume, developer activity, and user activity 8. We chose
‘State of the Dapps’ as it is recognised as the leading public
directory of DApps [33], which currently records seven DApp
platforms, Ethereum, EOS, Steem, POA, xDai, Loom, and
GoChain. We decided to limit our sample to Ethereum as it
is the oldest DApp-supporting cryptocurrency and the most
established as measured by market capitalisation, according to
data of the popular multi-digital currency platform Coinbase9.
Our sample of Ethereum crypto-games, presented in Table 2,
is based on the top-ranked games on ‘State of the Dapps’ on
March 6, 2019. As cryptocurrency valuations and user and
developer statistics fluctuate, the ‘State of the Dapps’ ranking
7One apple = £6.78.
8See https://www.stateofthedapps.com/rankings/platform/
ethereum/category/games, accessed 05/07/2019
9See https://www.coinbase.com/, accessed 05/07/2019.
30 Day Transaction Statistics Criteria Fulfilled
Name Accounts Vol (ETH) Vol (GBP) GBP/Account 1 2 3 4 5
CryptoKitties 2,749 1,331.895 139,023.20 50.57 ! ! ! ! !
MyCryptoHeroes 4,208 4,256.066 444,248.17 105.57 ! ! ! ! !
HyperDragons 882 481.977 50,308.76 57.04 ! ! ! ! !
Gods Unchained 914 1,228.185 128,197.95 140.26 ! ! ! ! !
0xUniverse 1,366 720.428 75,198.27 55.05 ! ! ! ! !
Evolution Land 140 106.236 11,088.91 79.21 ! ! ! ! !
Axie Infinity 625 1,072.305 111,927.20 179.08 ! ! ! ! !
Ethermon 876 54.209 5,658.34 6.44 ! ! ! ! !
Blockchain Cuties 1,501 81.267 8,482.02 5.65 ! ! ! ! !
Average 1,474 1,036.951 108,236.98 75.43 - - - - -
Table 2. Sample of popular Ethereum crypto-games covered in this paper. For each, we report (a) the number of active user accounts, trading volume
in Ethereum (ETH) and Great British Pounds (GBP), and average spend per account in GBP over the past 30 days on the sampling date of March 6,
2019. We also report (b) which gambling criteria each game matches.
itself shows fluctuation. However, over the period of several
months, we found our sample to be consistently in the top 20.
On the date of sampling, the price of 1 Ether (the Ethereum
cryptocurrency) was £104.38 per unit. When reporting mone-
tary statistics as follows, this exchange rate has been used to
convert values into real-world terms.
The average crypto-game in our sample has 1,474 active ac-
counts, ranging from 140 to 4,208, with a mean transaction
volume of £103,236.98 in the last 30 days. The mean transac-
tion volume per account, per 30 days, comes to £75.4310. By
comparison, the top 20 games on the game platform Steam in
2017 had between 500,000 and and 28 million owners, with
a top-heavy distribution: the median for owners per game on
Steam is 9,500, the median for so-called independent games
is 5,00011. Add to this that Steam is only one of several mar-
ketplaces through which a given game is usually published,
and you arrive at the assessment that in terms of player num-
bers, crypto-games are at most on par with typical independent
games.
Technical Properties
By definition, all sampled Ethereum crypto-games are DApps
that run on the Ethereum cryptocurrency. All sampled games
involve a digital wallet - briefly, a piece of software that allows
individuals to make electronic transactions on a network like
a cryptocurrency. The wallet holds a public-private pair of
cryptographic keys that serve as an address for sending and
receiving transactions, and as a test to authenticate - much like
an email-password combination where anyone can send emails
to the public email address (public key), but only someone with
the password (private key) can send emails from this address
[2,3,28]. Unlike regular bank accounts, a wallet with a public-
private key pair in principle requires no personal identifying
information to set up, which provides a degree of anonymity
that makes tracing accounts back to individuals problematic,
10When calculated independently, then averaged.
11See https://www.gdcvault.com/play/1025472/Steam-in-2017-
State-of, accessed 05/07/2019.
but also means that once a person loses or loses control over
their key pair, there is no principled way to retrieve it [13].
Once a player has created a digital wallet, cryptocurrency
exchanges allow them to spend real currency to purchase cryp-
tocurrency from other network users, which is then associated
with the player’s public key. Players can then spend this cryp-
tocurrency to purchase in-game items like virtual goods or
upgrades – much like many free-to-play games allow play-
ers to purchase an in-game currency like gold or gems which
they can then spend on in-game items. As in many online
games, crypto-games allow players to trade or auction such
in-game items in exchange for in-game currency. Unlike most
free-to-play games, in crypto-games, the in-game currency is
often exchangeable and can be used to pay for other goods
and services outside gameplay, and can be exchanged back for
real currency.
Like the cryptocurrency itself, the ownership of in-game items
is recorded on the game’s distributed ledger, meaning that no
single unilateral hack, glitch, or action on one database can
tamper with them. Furthermore, not only the game item’s
ownership data, but all game data and code exists as a DApp
stored on a distributed ledger with copies running on each
machine that runs the game. Every action in the game – every
game state change, such as a transaction between players –
therefore requires some machine which is part of the under-
lying network to execute the DApp code, and generate a new
entry in the game’s distributed ledger to record the resulting
game state change. This is then verified through consensus
and copied onto the ledgers on all other machines. Since
this processing consumes computational resources, Ethereum
crypto-games games incentivize participation by charging a
fractional amount of cryptocurrency (here: ETH) for each
game action, some or all of which is then distributed back to
the addresses of the owners of the machines that run the game
code.
All of the sampled crypto-games are browser games with an
HTML web interface and recommended browser extensions to
embed the player’s digital wallet. Players are also free to use a
non-integrated wallet to initiate transactions manually, should
their local state limitations allow. Several of the games also
integrate direct links to cryptocurrency exchanges into their
interface to streamline the process of transferring real-world
currency into the player’s digital wallet.
Gameplay
The gameplay of CryptoKitties revolves around trading and
breeding virtual cats. Players buy new cats from the game’s
market, or trade and auction cats among one another, all with
Ethereum. Players also breed or create new cats by either
mating two cats they own or mating a cat they own with a
public cat. Depending on which cats are mated with one
another, a new cat is produced with different properties, each
with different rarities. These rarities are most comparable to
attributes of cards found in trading card games. Owned kittens
can serve to complete collections that unlock further rewards,
but the main player aim suggested by the game’s website are
to simply collect cats, discover new cats, or breed and trade
cats for a profit.
MyCryptoHeroes focuses on building teams of heroes to em-
bark on quests, each costing a fee based on quality and likeli-
hood of higher-rarity loot gathered. Gameplay involves choos-
ing and modifying the team composition of a collection of
heroes, then choosing missions to attempt, each of which cost-
ing an amount of ‘energy’ per team member to complete. This
is currently the most popular crypto-game available with over
£100,000 in weekly trading volume - see Table 2 for 30-day
figure. Following the fictitious example of the numerosity ef-
fect in the introduction: MyCryptoHeroes uses Crypto Energy
as one in-game currency, which can be purchased with GUM,
another in-game currency, which can be purchased with Ether.
Gods Unchained can be described as the most unique in the
selection, as it is a trading card game following a similar art
style and gameplay as Blizzard’s Hearthstone [1]. It does
not include an intermediate currency for its virtual cards, and
offers less idle-style gameplay than other titles presented. As
in Hearthstone, players can create decks of virtual cards then
combat each other in a turn-based style.
Given the similarities of several crypto-games in the ranking,
we finally outline Evolution Land, which can be described as
a peer-to-peer virtual land marketplace, where users manage
virtual plots of land in one of several unique areas. Gameplay
involves trading and modelling of these plots of land, with
certain areas in higher demand given their central location on
the map or other desirable characteristics.
The remaining crypto-games in Table 2 can be described as
variations or combinations of the above gameplay elements
so are not individually described. This can be confirmed indi-
vidually through each of the games websites and promotional
content as described in the previous subsection.
Mechanics
This section explores prevalent mechanics in the sampled
crypto-games.
Generating Virtual Goods
The generation of new virtual goods is key to creating enjoy-
able virtual economies in video games, this is comprehensively
discussed by Lehdonvirta and Castronova [26]. Several of the
crypto-games in Table 2 use breeding mechanics to achieve
this generation whereby two existing goods can be combined
to create a third. The breeding mechanics found in CryptoKit-
ties, HyperDragons, Axie Infinity, and Blockchain Cuties all
feature some chance mechanic, such that the desirable traits
carried over to the next generation cannot be specified, making
repeated attempts essential in long term play. In these exam-
ples, the value of the resulting virtual creature is variable, as
successful breeding may result in a more (or less) desirable
trait set meaning an overall increase (or decrease) in the value
of the player’s collection (if the value of their digital wallet is
included). Parallels can be drawn here with the chance based
mechanics found in loot boxes/gacha games [22], which echo
similar variability in outcome. This aligns with consensus
in the virtual economics literature that, generally speaking,
rarity implies value; the more difficult an item is to create,
the more valuable it becomes [26]. This means that although
the chances of creating rarer, more valuable virtual goods are
lower than more common goods, there is still an incentive to
make these repeated attempts.
Multiplayer Gameplay
Multiplayer mechanics in the form of direct interactions be-
tween players specific to completion of in-game objectives are
commonly found in standard games, especially those in the
battle royale genre [5] such as Apex Legends [30] and Fort-
nite [8]. We may infer that crypto-games suit particular genres
of game more than others. For example, single-player games
are non-existent in the selection given the non-equivalence of
the virtual goods they contain - it would therefore be fruitless
decentralising their storage to facilitate player ownership. The
multiplayer components of the games presented here also vary
in terms of the depth of their effect on gameplay. Polarised
examples include CryptoKitties, where user-user interaction
occurs solely in the marketplace, and Gods Unchained, where
players directly compete with one another in turn-based com-
bat. The first example varies significantly from comparative
standard games likeHearthstone12, in that the game relies only
on the attributes of the virtual goods in the player’s collection.
The second example contains an element of skill in the form
of player interactions with their card deck and their opponent,
so sits closer to the type of direct multiplayer interaction found
in standard games.
Micro-transactions
As mentioned previously, the decentralised nature of crypto-
games means each in-game action incurs a cost specific to the
design of the game in question. This manifests in the form
of micro-transactions in either the underlying cryptocurrency,
or in some sub-currency which can be purchased with the
underlying cryptocurrency. Examples include CryptoKitties
breeding mechanic where the player may combine two kitties
for a set amount of Ether, andMyCryptoHeroes mission me-
chanic, where the player may send their team on a mission for
12Gameplay in Hearthstone has a card collection element, it is this
element with which we draw comparisons.
Crypto Energy. These two examples are typical of costs baked
into the design of the games themselves, where in-game activ-
ities require a usually small monetary investment. It should
be noted that this monetary investment may go completely to
those operating machines which process the underlying net-
work’s transactions, or some may go to the developers of the
crypto-game in question. This decision is made at the game
design level and varies between those in the selection. For the
crypto-games described in this work, a portion must always
go to those verifying transactions on the Ethereum network.
Trading Virtual Goods
The final mechanic underpinning all of the games selected
is the trading of virtual goods on an in-game marketplace.
Players, through completing in-game activities, may receive
generated virtual goods as described above which can then
be sold for cryptocurrency or in-game currency. Each game
in Table 2 includes its own marketplace operating limit-order
mechanisms, i.e. players issue sell orders for goods at a set
price, and upon creation of an equivalent buy order both are
resolved and the goods are transferred. These marketplaces
are freely accessible to all players, with no restrictions on the
number of virtual goods a player may purchase, other than
the funds available in their digital wallet. The transaction
costs inherent to the Ethereum network, as described in the
‘Technical Properties’ subsection, also apply to each of the
transactions in the marketplace(s) of these games.
CRYPTO-GAMES AND GAMBLING
This section introduces the psychological and legal definitions
of gambling, and key differences in their application to game
mechanics and crypto-games. Existing definitions are then
combined, yielding a single set of criteria whose application
distinguishes typical risk taking activities in such games from
gambling. We then apply these combined criteria to our sam-
ple of crypto-games, discussing their interpretation from both
legal and psychological perspectives as appropriate. Recent
work on loot boxes and gacha games, as defined in Table 1,
are included as naturally parallel discussion points between
these currently distinct topics.
Definitions of Gambling
The psychological and legal definitions of gambling each focus
on different aspects of chance based games. In the psycholog-
ical case, the emphasis lies on the behaviour enabled by the
activity, whereas the legal definition focuses on the financial
components of outcomes.
Furthermore, both definitions are subject to interpretation so
may yield opposing conclusions in their application to video
games, as discussed in the following section. We begin by
describing historically influential definitions of gambling, with
recent additions specific to mechanics found in video games.
Psychological Definitions
Psychological interest in gambling typically concerns the abil-
ity of an activity to influence behaviours such as spending
and frequency of participation [9, 27]. These activities require
differentiation from simple risk-taking or chance-based play,
in that some may foster potentially adverse behaviours [4]. To
this end, Griffiths developed four criteria to distinguish gam-
bling from simple risk-taking behaviours [15], revised from
his seminal work on gambling classification [14]13. These
revised criteria are as follows;
1. The exchange is determined by the outcome of a future
event, which is unknown at the time of betting
2. The outcome of the future event is at least partly due to
chance
3. An exchange of money/objects of financial value occurs,
typically without productive work from either side
4. Losses can be avoided by not taking part in the activity
These four criteria naturally fit traditional casino games. Take
roulette as an example: A player must place bets on where
the roulette ball will land, without knowing where it will land
(1). The landing position of the ball is due to chance (2). A
player places bets with chips exchangeable for money, and
loses or gains chips based on the ball’s landing position, with
no further work involved (3). Finally, the player would not
lose money if they were to not play (4). As expected, roulette
meets this psychological definition of gambling as it fulfils all
four criteria.
Griffiths’ criteria have been usefully applied outside of tradi-
tional casino games. Specifically, Drummond and Sauer have
used them to assess whether loot boxes are psychologically
akin to gambling [7]. In trying to distinguish gambling-like
from non-gambling like mechanics, Drummond and Sauer
retained Griffith’s original fifth criterion (winners gain at the
expense of losers) and found it necessary to add a sixth crite-
rion, namely the ability to ‘cash out’ winnings. In this, they
followed the legal definition of gambling used by regulatory
bodies (see below). Applying these six criteria, Drummond
and Sauer [7] concluded that loot boxes in several popular
video games “appear to meet both the psychological and le-
gal definitions of gambling”. To give an example from their
work, players in the game FIFA 18 can open packs which
contain new players. The content of these packs is not known
at the time of purchase (1), the content is based on chance (2),
packs can be purchased using virtual currency which can be
purchased for real money (3), and losses can be avoided by
non-participation (4). Finally, the winnings of these packs can
give a direct competitive in-game advantage to the player (5).
In the case of FIFA 18, the resulting in-game items can also be
‘cashed out’ for real money14 (6) satisfying their final criteria.
This extension of Griffith’s criteria partially coincides with
Koeder and colleagues’ recent analysis of gacha games, where
again exchange for real money is a core criterion to classi-
fication of an activity as gambling [22]. Unlike Drummond
and Sauer, Koeder et al. take a design-focused taxonomy of
gambling games as their starting point of definition [11]. In-
terestingly, they inversely conclude that loot boxes and gacha
games ‘would not qualify as gambling’ as no items of real
13This revision removed one criterion from his original five: Winners
gain at the sole expense of losers.
14Irrespective of whether this cashing out is actively supported or
suppressed by the game company [38].
monetary value can be won. The two conclusions here com-
plement one another in that the first argues that they may be
considered gambling should real-value exchange be possible,
whereas the other argues that they may not, should such ex-
change not be possible. This means similar conclusions may
be drawn as to whether chance based mechanics in games meet
definitions of gambling, even when using different criteria, a
point discussed further in Section 5.
Legal Definitions
Legal definitions of gambling are by nature specific to the
legislative entity (nation state or federation) in question; legal
scholarship on the matter is therefore either grounded in a
particular (typically national) legislation or engages in cross-
national comparison. That said, there is significant overlap
between national legislations. In the following, we focus on
legal definitions in the United Kingdom. Here, the UK Gam-
bling Act defines gambling as ‘playing a game of chance for
a prize’, where a game of chance is ‘a game that is presented
as involving an element of chance’15. The prize is defined
as ‘money or money’s worth’. This definition has recently
been considered to be expanded by the UK Gambling Com-
mission’s position paper on virtual currencies, esports, and
social casino gaming [6]. This defines prize as ‘in-game items
or currencies which can be won, traded or sold [and] can be
converted into cash or exchanged for items of value’. As can
be seen, this definition places emphasis on the financial value
of winnings in relation to chance exclusively, irrespective of
any psychological repercussions of such activities.
As with psychological definitions, legal definitions find appli-
cation outside of traditional casino games, specifically with
respect to loot boxes and gacha-style mechanics, whose le-
gal classification as gambling or gaming is currently a point
of contention across national regulators [22] [21]. This con-
tention hinges on the exchange of items for real world value
as above. Notably, to what extent the purchasing and trading
of in-game items constitutes real-world value exchange has
long been and continues to be a divisive issue in the field
of virtual economics [25, 32]. We argue that this contention
expressly does not apply to crypto-games given the directly
exchangeable nature of in-game tokens to cryptocurrencies
and cryptocurrencies to real currency, as described in ‘Techni-
cal Properties’ above. This key difference is further expanded
in the following subsection.
Combined Definition
For the purposes of assessing crypto-games, we will in the
following use a set of psychologically-oriented criteria. We
take Griffiths’ four revised criteria, repeated below for con-
venience, to meet the psychological definition, plus the sixth
suggested by Drummond and Sauer, which mirrors the rele-
vance of monetary exchange of value in legal definitions:
1. The exchange is determined by the outcome of a future
event, which is unknown at the time of betting
2. The outcome of the future event is at least partly due to
chance
15This is one of three definitions of ‘game of chance’ - see the UK
Gambling Act 2005 section 6.2(a).
3. An exchange of money/objects of financial value occurs,
typically without productive work from either side
4. Losses can be avoided by not taking part in the activity
5. Real-world money can be obtained by ‘cashing out’ win-
nings
In the following, we will use these criteria to assess whether
playing the crypto-games in our sample (Table 2) meet the
combined definition of gambling, specifically focusing on
how their shared and individual mechanics contribute to the
fulfilment of each criteria.
Crypto-Game Mechanics as Gambling
The generation of virtual goods, micro-transactions, and
chance-based mechanics found in crypto-games, as described
in ‘Ethereum Crypto-Games’ above, each contribute in differ-
ent ways to meeting our definition of gambling above. The
right side of Table 2 contains which of the sampled games
meet which criteria.
Criterion 1: The exchange is determined by the outcome of a
future event, which is unknown at the time of betting
In applying this criterion, we consider the term ‘betting’ to
mean any payment made before an in-game activity occurs,
where payment is required by the activity. In the context
of crypto-games such as CryptoKitties, this activity may be
the breeding of two existing kitties, which results in a new
kitty with attributes derived from the original two. Other
examples include entering dragons into arena competitions in
HyperDragons, or sending ‘mon’ on adventures for treasure
in Ethermon.
In all these examples, the future event - the newly bred kitty,
the outcome of the arena competition, or the treasure gained
from adventuring, is unknown at the time of payment. This
results in the exchange being determined by the outcome of
a future event, in that a player may make payment of higher
or lower value than the virtual goods received as a result of
their activity. Notably, the future events considered are not
solely the generation of new virtual goods, e.g. via breeding
mechanics; participation in chance-based adventures and com-
petitions is a core element satisfying this criterion across all
games in Table 2.
Criterion 2: The outcome of the future event is at least partly
due to chance
In each of the examples above, a chance-based mechanic gov-
erns the outcome of the in-game activity. For example, the
breeding mechanic may favourably combine two existing kit-
ties in CryptoKitties such that a high value kitty is created,
however it may be equally (if not more) likely that a lower
value kitty is created. Similarly, Axie Infinity’s breeding me-
chanic is functionally comparable to that of CryptoKitties:
players can choose what to breed, affecting the odds some-
what, but the ultimate result of each breeding is chance-based.
This equally applies to arena outcomes in HyperDragons, ad-
venturing in Ethermon, and raid boss mechanics in Blockchain
Cuties: players somewhat affect probability distributions of
an ultimately stochastic outcome. As shown in Table 2, this
criterion is fulfilled by all crypto-games presented.
Criterion 3: An exchange of money/objects of financial value
occurs, typically without productive work from either side
Under this criterion, the fact that Ethereum crypto-games are
DApps introduces an interesting complexity. Principally, any
activity across the Ethereum network paid in Ether constitutes
financial value exchange. For example, the breeding of any
two virtual creatures in CryptoKitties, Axie Infinity, Ethermon,
HyperDragons, and Blockchain Cuties, requires a transaction
cost be paid irrespective of any additional charges included in
the design of the game. Similarly, in 0xUniverse, planetary
exploration using spaceships requires a transaction cost be
paid. This cost is the minimum required payment for any of
the above activities to be completed, more specifically for their
outcome or initiation to be stored on the Ethereum blockchain.
Arguably, the computers executing the games’ code do some
work, in the same sense that a slot machine or croupier does
productive work which is enabling the game to exist and run
in the first place. However, classic gambling definitions do
not consider this kind of game-constitutive work as produc-
tive work. Thus, by definition, this criterion is fulfilled by all
Ethereum crypto-games, as a direct result of the transaction
cost mechanism used in the Ethereum network and its insepa-
rability from performing actions in crypto-games. Conversely,
were crypto-games run without an architectural dependence
on transaction costs, only those which incur a fee by design
would fulfil this criterion. In addition to the basic transaction
fee for executing any in-game action, all sampled Ethereum
crypto-games also charge cryptocurrency for purchasing in-
game tokens that is in excess on the code execution fee or cost.
This alone fulfils this criterion for all games selected.
Criterion 4: Losses can be avoided by not taking part in the
activity
We consider fulfilment of this criteria to include the investment
of some amount of real world monetary value on typical activ-
ities within each of the crypto-games presented. Each of the
activities described so far appear typical to the games in which
they exist. Given the fulfilment of each of these games of the
previous criteria, we may conclude that the simple act of not
playing any of the crypto-games presented would result in the
avoidance of losses. Whilst we acknowledge that several of the
activities across the crypto-games may not result in an overall
loss of value all of the time, the transaction cost used to per-
form such activities is irrecoverable so is lost for every activity
performed. For this reason all of the crypto-games presented
fulfil this criterion, also due in part to the collectable nature
of in-game items promoted by their mechanics. As with the
previous criterion, negation of transaction costs would mean
only those with fees by design would fulfil this criterion.
Criterion 5: Real-world money can be obtained by ‘cashing
out’ winnings
In the context of the crypto-games presented, we consider
‘cashing out’ as the exchange of tokens for cryptocurrency,
which can in turn be exchanged for real-world currency. This
is supported by the existence of cryptocurrency exchanges,
where they can be readily exchanged for legal tender [10] in
states where such exchanges are available. This criterion is
fulfilled by all of the crypto-games presented. For example,
Evolution Land’s tokens can be directly exchanged for cryp-
tocurrency, given the nature of their storage on the distributed
ledger. Similarly, in each of the crypto-games featuring breed-
ing mechanics, an in-game marketplace is implemented where
users can exchange their virtual creatures for cryptocurrency.
Given the collectable nature of these creatures, this is consid-
ered a typical part of gameplay, with each such game fulfilling
this criterion by design.
In summary, we find that all sampled crypto-games currently
operating atop the Ethereum network meet our combined def-
inition of gambling. We now consider the limitations of our
approach, with specific focus on the subjectivity of definitions,
and their interpretations.
LIMITATIONS
Discussion so far surrounding the convergence of gaming,
specifically mechanics in games, and gambling have been
limited to loot boxes and gacha games. Discussions include,
but are not limited to, their relation to problematic gambling
severity [34], and impact on adolescent behaviours [36]. Our
initial definitional analysis notably cannot speak to the actual
psychological and behavioural effects of crypto-game play,
and to what extent it approximates problem gambling. This is
an important area for future work.
Second, different legal and psychological definitions exist
to classify activities as gambling, and prior work applying
them to gaming uses different definitions [15] [11] [22]. We
transparently chose one particular combination of these def-
initional criteria, but others are possible and defensible. In
addition, different interpretations of each criterion are possible
and can be found in the literature. An example is the ‘ex-
change of money/objects of financial value’ criterion, with the
real financial value of virtual goods being a heavily contested
debate [16]. Methodologically, this limitation could be over-
come through the development of a coding handbook as used
in quantitative content analysis [23], or through the systematic
application of a collection of definitions found throughout
current literature.
Given the rapidly changing landscape of blockchain gaming,
our paper relied on a discrete sample of Ethereum crypto-
games that were top-ranking on a particular platform at the
time of writing. As such, it is not necessarily fully represen-
tative of all currently existing crypto-games or blockchain
gaming more generally. One can also expect the landscape
to change over time, so that our findings may be outmoded
by game innovation. Future work should therefore assess a
broader sample of crypto-games, including those operating on
other cryptocurrency networks, and assessing the evolution
of the form over time. Our selection has also depended on
an external ranking system; a stricter academically-grounded
ranking system presents an interesting area of future work, on
which very little literature exists [33].
Finally, whilst this work has aimed to identify characteris-
tics of crypto-games and their similarities with gambling, not
all countries allow cryptocurrency to be exchanged for legal
tender, making playing such games (and importantly, the ’cash-
ing out’ of in-game items) legally impossible. For instance,
cryptocurrency exchange is legal in the UK, but prohibited or
implicitly banned in countries such as Pakistan and China16.
This means that any conclusions drawn from this work only
apply to countries where the financial means to play such
games are legal.
DISCUSSION
We find that several of the highest ranking crypto-games cur-
rently operating on the Ethereum network meet a combined
definition of gambling. This definition builds on existing sets
of criteria in the gambling literature, taking a psychological ba-
sis, and adding a final criterion on ‘cashing out winnings’ that
previous authors found necessary for the analysis of compa-
rable phenomena like loot boxes, and mirrors legal gambling
definitions.
Specifically, we found that several mechanical similarities ex-
ist between current implementations of crypto-games, specif-
ically breeding mechanics, and chance-based rewards found
in standard games such as loot boxes. However, unlike games
with loot boxes or gacha mechanics, all crypto-games dis-
cussed in this paper allow the direct or indirect exchange of
in-game items for real world money. This makes them more
readily fit current criteria of gambling. That said, we hasten to
add that not all crypto-games necessarily follow this finding,
given the immense variability of underlying cryptocurrency
technologies, fee structures, and design decisions.
Although those presented here meet our combined definition
of gambling, crypto-games offer a new gaming paradigm un-
der which players may exercise cryptographically-secured
ownership of the virtual goods they earn and trade. This new
paradigm has the potential to give more control to users, and
presents an interesting future direction of game development
and design. When combined with the numerosity effect - that
the perceived value of goods changes with the numerosity of
the currency they are purchased with [18] - another dimension
to the issues presented emerges, as the effects described above
may be amplified or suppressed depending on the design of
the game. This interaction of effects represents a valuable area
of future work.
We conclude this discussion with a list of key points:
• Current crypto-games design focuses on the generation and
ownership of virtual goods
• Payment for in-game actions, paired with some chance
mechanic, is core to activities in crypto-games
• By design, decentralised in-game items in crypto-games
can be exchanged for other currencies/items
• Popular crypto-games on the Ethereum network meet our
combined definition of gambling specific to video games
FUTURE WORK
The mechanisms outlined in this work, and corresponding
unexplored psychological effects, leave a rich landscape in
which to pursue further work. This work has only investigated
16Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/
world-survey.php, accessed 05/07/2019
crypto-games found using the Ethereum cryptocurrency net-
work, leaving much room for exploration and mapping of other
DApp ecosystems such as the EOS and TRON networks [2].
Given the decentralised nature of the DApps in question, a
comprehensive computational exploration of the blockchains
of relevant cryptocurrencies would provide valuable insight
into player behaviours, both from a gameplay and financial
perspective.
Survey style studies such as those conducted by Zendle and
Cairns [35] may more accurately inform conclusions regarding
regulation and effects on player behaviour. Further studies in
this vein may investigate the financial and/or psychological
profiles of those who play standard games versus those who
play crypto-games. Such comparative work would inform
likely directions of industry development and highlight more
fruitful avenues of further study.
Finally, the development of a set of design-specific criteria,
based on the five point criteria set presented here, may aid
crypto-game developers such that they do not inadvertently
create gambling platforms from the original goal of making
non-gambling games. These criteria may be integrated into
the design process to identify any gameplay conditions, which
may meet the criteria of gambling discussed above, to be
avoided as/if required.
CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the gameplay style, underlying me-
chanics, and macroscopic user spending profiles of several
popular crypto-games. Parallels have been drawn with chance
based mechanics in standard games, presenting a means by
which existing work on related topics such as loot boxes may
be applied to this emerging domain. We have presented con-
nections in recent literature regarding the similarity between
the architecture of crypto-games and traditional gambling sys-
tems, specifically around their chance based mechanics and the
payment for completion of tasks that underpin these games.
The effect of this combination means high ranking crypto-
games, when classified using well defined criteria for simple
risk taking versus gambling, meet our combined definition of
gambling.
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